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This introductory document discusses topics related to malware detection via the application 
of machine learning algorithms. It is intended as a supplement to the published work 
submitted (a complete list of which can be found in Table 1) and outlines the motivation 
behind the experiments.  
The document begins with the following sections: 
 
• Section 2 presents a preliminary discussion of the research methodology employed. 
• Section 3 presents the background analysis of malware detection in general, and the 
use of machine learning. 
• Section 4 provides a brief introduction of the most common machine learning 
algorithms in current use. 
 
The remaining sections present the main body of the experimental work, which lead to the 
conclusions in Section 10. 
 
• Section 5 analyzes different initialization strategies for machine learning models, with 
a view to ensuring that the most effective training and testing strategy is employed. 
Following this, a purely dynamic approach is proposed, which results in perfect 
classification of the samples against benign files, and therefore provides a baseline 
against which the performance of subsequent static approaches can be compared. 
• Section 6 introduces the static-based tests, beginning with the challenging problem of 
zero-day detection samples, i.e. malware samples for which not enough data has been 
gathered yet to train the machine learning models. 
• Section 7 describes the testing of several different approaches to static malware 
detection. During these tests, the effectiveness of these algorithms is analyzed and 
compared with other means of classification. 
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• Section 8 proposes and compares techniques to boost the detection accuracy by 
combining the scores obtained from other detection algorithms, with a view to 
improving static classification scores and thus reach the perfect detection obtained 
with dynamic features. 
• Section 9 tests the effectiveness of generic malware models by assessing the detection 
effectiveness of a generic malware model trained on several different families. The 
experiments are intended to introduce a more realistic scenario where a single, 
comprehensive, machine learning model is used to detect several families. This 
Section shows the difficulty to build a single model to detect several malware families. 
 
1.2 Personal contribution  
All the research proposed has been the result of a combined effort of several individuals. The 
first name in each paper is always the master’s student that helped in the experiments and 
the setup of the necessary tools. The remaining nominatives are the creator of the idea at the 
base of the research. The last name is also the official advisor for the master’s student.  
In Table 1, the percentage estimation of the author’s contribution to every given publication 
is shown. These percentages take also account of the manual work behind each experiment. 
An indication of the number of citations per each paper is also added. The data is taken from 
Google Scholar (Google). 
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1.3 Research Questions 
This research work is based on the use of machine learning algorithms in the context of 
advanced malware detection, that is, detection of highly obfuscated malware families. This 
approach is analyzed and compared to ad-hoc techniques designed to obtain the same goal. 
In fact, several advanced malware detection techniques have been based on ad-hoc solutions. 
Some examples can be found in (Rajeswaran, et al., 2018), (Xu, et al., 2013) and (Shanmugam, 
et al., 2013) However, the application of machine learning based techniques has obtained 
interesting results, even in the case of high percentage of obfuscation. For example, the 
application of Support Vector Machines in (Singh, et al., 2016), or 𝑘𝑘-Nearest Neighbors in (Liu 
L., 2017), and also an algorithm based on Hidden Markov Models in (Wong, et al., 2006). A 
direct comparison of several ad-hoc techniques with machine learning approaches is thus 
described in this work, with the aim of pushing further the state-of-the-art proposing 
approaches that allow to detect even the most challenging malicious samples. 
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Several questions have been driven this work. Is it possible to achieve the same level of 
classification accuracy obtainable taking advantage of dynamic features but still relying on 
static ones?  Which technique would be more effective in case of high level of obfuscation, or 
when the machine learning model has few samples (or none) to be trained on? To reach the 
answer to these questions, many complex experiments were performed. For example, testing 
the accuracy of the classification by constantly increasing the degree of dead code insertion 
in the infected samples (which is a very effective obfuscation technique against machine 
learning based detection (Wong, et al., 2006)) and proposing a challenging set of experiments, 
such as zero-day detection (Section 6) and cold start classification (Section 8).  
 
1.4 Novel Contributions 
To clarify in which way each of the papers that form the backbone of this research work have 
introduced novel contributions to the field, a description per each paper is given here. 
A comparison of static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis for malware detection.  
A comparison of malware detection techniques based on static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis 
is proposed. Specifically, this work proposes a new testing scenario where Hidden Markov 
Models (HMMs) have been trained on both static and dynamic feature sets and the resulting 
detection rates have been compared.  
 
Malware Detection Using Dynamic Birthmarks 
In this paper, we see a first application of Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMMs) in detecting 
dynamically extracted API calls sequences. Furthermore, a comparison is made with a 
previous work where PHMM was used based on static features.  
Clustering for malware classification 
Here, we apply clustering techniques to the malware classification problem. We compute 
clusters using the well-known K-means and Expectation Maximization algorithms, with the 
underlying scores based on Hidden Markov Models.  
 
Clustering versus SVM for malware detection 
Following up on “Clustering for malware classification” paper, cluster analysis is applied to the 
challenging problem of classifying previously unknown malware (zero-day experiments). In 
addition, the clustering results are compared to those obtained when a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) is trained on the malware family.  
 
Vigenère scores for malware detection 
Previous research has applied classic cryptanalytic techniques to the malware detection 
problem. In this one, two new malware scoring techniques are proposed, both based on the 
classic Vigenère cipher. One of them relies only on the index of coincidence (IC), while the 
other is based on a more complete cryptanalysis of a Vigenère cipher, where the IC calculation 






Deep Learning versus Gist Descriptors for Image-based Malware Classification 
Image features known as “gist descriptors” have been applied to the malware classification 
problem. This approach is tested against obfuscated malware, and a feature reduction is 
performed to determine a minimal set of gist features. It is then compared to a deep learning 
technique working directly on the image files without requiring any further manipulation.  
 
Function Call Graphs Versus Machine Learning for Malware Detection 
A function call graph approach is compared against machine learning techniques in detecting 
highly obfuscated malware samples. This work provides evidence that machine learning is 
likely to perform better than ad-hoc approaches. 
 
Robust Hashing for Image-based Malware Classification 
A first time comparison of SVM with Robust Hashing is proposed in this paper. Also, a new 
Robust Hash approach is proposed, combining distributed coding and wavelet analysis.  
Hidden Markov models with random restarts versus boosting for malware detection 
A comparison of two different applications of HMM based detection is proposed. That is, 
implemented for the first time through AdaBoost algorithm, and applying random restarts for 
the initial matrix distributions. A new set of experiments, called cold start, is also introduced. 
In these experiments, we train the models starting from a very limited number of samples (to 
simulate a more realistical and slow discovery of individual samples belonging to the same 
malware family). The cold start experiments allow to justify the overhead of the AdaBoost 
based technique in this special challenge.  
Support vector machines and malware detection 
In this research, three advanced malware scoring techniques, namely, Hidden Markov Models, 
Simple Substitution Distance, and Opcode Graph based detection, are combined through a 
Support Vector Machine. We see that combining scores in this way yields results that are 
significantly more robust than those obtained singularly using any of the individual scores. 
 
On the Effectiveness of Generic Malware Models 
A model that results to be too generic to be useful is obtained by extracting common features 
from extremely general malware families. This issue is analyzed via controlled experiments to 
determine the tradeoff between generality and accuracy over a variety of machine learning 













2 Research Methodology 
  
 
This section describes the methodologies applied throughout these experiments, together 
with the respective datasets. It also describes the scoring techniques chosen to optimize the 
information provided by each kind of test. 
 
2.1 The Dataset 
The experiments required both malware and benign samples, the aim being to differentiate 
the former from the latter. However, not all the experiments analysed relied on the same 
type of feature. It was therefore not possible to run all the experiments on all the samples, 
though whenever possible files were shared among compatible tests. For example, some 
experiments are based on the image representation of the binary data, while others require 
the disassembling of the samples to obtain the list of opcodes. Where, with the term opcodes, 
we indicate the extracted mnemonic symbols from the disassembled assembly code.  
In another set of experiments, n-grams are obtained from the binary data. In this context, an 
n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n bytes extracted from a given file. A n-gram of size 1 is 
referred to as a "unigram", size 2 as a "bigram" or "digram", size 3 as a "trigram", and so on.  
For example, if we have a list of bytes, such as “ABCAB”, the corresponding list of digrams 
would be: AB, BC, CA, AB. 
Since the work was limited to malicious software on Microsoft Windows, different malware 
families and benign file collections were made of Windows executables. For the former, a 
group of infected files were obtained from the following well-known datasets, infecting 
Windows 7: 
 
• Malicia (Malicia, 2013), 
• Malimg (Nataraj, et al., 2011),  
• Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge (Kaggle, 2015). 
 
The choice of those particular datasets was corroborated by the wide number of research 
works that already relied on them. In this way, a direct comparison with previous work can 
be applied with ease.   
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In particular, the family used from the Malicia dataset were Harebot, Security Shield, Smart 
HDD, Winwebsec, Zbot and ZeroAccess. While from the Microsoft Malware Classification 
Challenge were Gatak, Kelihos, Lollipop, Obfuscator.ACY and Ramnit. The image-based 
experiments used the families from the Malimg dataset, that were Adialer, Agent, Allaple, 
Alueron, Autorun, C2LOP, Dialplatform, Dontovo, Fakerean, Instantaccess, Malex, 
Obfuscator, Rbot, Skintrim, Swizzor, Swizzor, VB, Wintrim, Yuner. 
 
Figure 1 - Variants of the malware family Dialplatform.B 
 
Figure 1 shows four variants of the malware family Dialplatform.B viewed as images. 
In this case, we clearly see common structure in the images, which indicates that there 
is significant potential for an image-based malware scoring technique. 
However, the majority of the experiments relied on the Malicia dataset, with the 
exception of our work in (Bagga, et al., 2018) that relied also on the Microsoft Malware 
Classification Challenge families, and the image-based experiments in our 
(Yajamanam, et al., 2018)  and (Huang, et al., 2018) that relied on the Maligm dataset.  
Additional samples were generated using the Next Generation Virus Creation Kit 
(NGVSK) (NGVSK, 2001), but they were used exclusively in our (Deshmukh, et al., 2018) 
and (Singh, et al., 2016) as a means of comparison with the previous published works.  
16 
 
Benign samples were collected from two primary sources: 
 
• A fresh installation of Microsoft Windows 7, using an official Microsoft DVD-ROM, 
• A clean installation in Windows 7 of the command-line Windows interface Cygwin 
(Cyg)  
 
These samples were tested using the VirusTotal API (VirusTotal) and any obtaining less than 
100% positive response was removed. 
  
Another factor was the “balancing” of the samples:  ideally each malware family should be 
represented equally in each sample, but in practice this is not always the case. For this reason, 
different malware families were combined from various groups, where the samples per family 
was at least 100. Furthermore, to obtain an equal number of files per each family, it was 
established that each should contain the same number of files. 
A brief description of the families used from the (Kaggle, 2015) dataset can be found in (Bagga, 
et al., 2018), while a description of the families in the (Malicia, 2013) dataset can be found in 
(Damodaran, et al., 2017). Finally, the (Nataraj, et al., 2011) dataset is described in 
(Yajamanam, et al., 2018). In the current document, each experiment is introduced specifying 
the exact malware families used and the type of extracted features. 
 
2.2 Score techniques 
Throughout these experiments, no single technique was used to compare the accuracy of 
different classification approaches. Instead, the scores were based on Receiver Operator 
Characteristic (ROC) curve (Fawcett, 2006) and Precision-Recall (Davis, 2006), though other 
scoring techniques were introduced whenever they proved to be more informative in a given 
experiment. For example, a modified accuracy (defined as balanced accuracy) is introduced 
in our work (Bagga, et al., 2018) to face the large unbalance between the positive and negative 
samples. The basic techniques are described below. 
2.2.1 Receiver Operator Characteristic  
To compute a ROC curve, we begin with a scatterplot containing “positive” and “negative” 
scores: in these experiments, the “positive” instances ideally represent the malware samples 
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requiring detection, and the “negative” instances belong to the benign dataset. In practice 
however, some malware samples score negatively (“false negatives”) and some benign 
samples score positively (“false positives”). By adjusting the threshold between the two 
categories, that is, the decision boundary for which a value above it indicates a positive 
instance and a value below indicates a negative one, we can plot the False Positive Rate FPR 
(a number between 0 and 1 indicating the portion of samples falsely classified as positive) 
against the True Positive Rate TPR (again between 0 and 1). Finally we compute the area 
under this curve (the “AUC”) whose value gives a measure of success for the computed binary 
classification (Bradley, 1997). AUC is always in the range 0.5 to 1.0, and its two extreme cases 
are as follows: 
 
• AUC=1.0 indicates that it a threshold level exists for which no classification error 
occurs. 
• AUC=0.5 indicates that the classification is no better results than flipping a coin: there 
is a 50% chance that any sample may be misclassified. 
 
Figure 1 (left) shows an example of a scattergram, where the solid red circles correspond to 
malware samples (positives) and hollow blue squares to the benign samples (negatives). The 
horizontal yellow line represents one possible threshold. Since 7 out of 10 red circles lie above 
the line, the True Positive Rate TPR=0.7. Similarly, 2 out of the 10 blue squares lie above the 
line, meaning that the False Positive Rate FPR=0.2. Figure 1 (right) shows the corresponding 
ROC, where the black dot at (0.2, 0.7) represents this threshold. The rest of the curve 
corresponds to the variation of the threshold and the resulting rates. The shaded region is the 





Figure 2 - Scatterplot and corresponding ROC curve 
 
2.2.2 Precision Recall 
Another means of quantifying the success of binary classification is Precision and Recall (PR) 
analysis (Davis, 2006).  While similar to ROC in terms of the information gathered, it performs 
better (for example) when the number of “match cases” (i.e., True Positives) is small relative 
to the total number of samples. Recall refers to the fraction of elements classified as positive 
that belong to the positive match set, while precision is the fraction of positive elements 









where 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the number of true positives, 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 the number of false positives, and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is the 
number of false negatives. While recall corresponds to the true positive rate defined for ROC, 
precision is not the same as the false positive rate used in ROC. Another critical difference is 
that there is no consideration of true negatives (𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹). This is beneficial if our focus is on the 
positive set, and especially when this is relatively large in comparison to the negative set. 
As with ROC, we compute the area under the PR Curve (AUC-PR) as a measure of the success 
of the classification. This curve is computed following a similar process to the one explained 
in Section 2.2.1, where per each threshold the ratio is now described by the precision and 
recall. Figure 3 (left) shows the same data as in Section 2.2.1, while Figure 2 (right) plots the 
(recall, precision) pair as the threshold level varies. The threshold shown in the scatterplot 
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represents 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 7, 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 = 2, and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 3, so recall = 7
7+3
= 0.7 and precision = 7
7+2
≈ 0.78, 








This is used to smooth out bias in experiments. For n-fold cross-validation, the malware 
samples are split into n folders; a machine learning model is trained over (n−1) of these 
folders, while the remaining folder is used for testing. These steps are repeated n times, 
always changing the folder used to test. Finally, the average of all the n scores is computed 
and considered as the final score of the experiment. Following this procedure, cross-
validation allows to smooth out biases in the dataset (Stamp, 2017). 
 
2.3 Tools 
Section 2.1 mentioned that in different experiments, different types of feature were 
extracted from the dataset. For example, in the majority of the experiments (except 
(Yajamanam, et al., 2018), (Huang, et al., 2018) and (Bagga, et al., 2018), where the features 
where extracted from the binary files without disassembling them), executable malware 
samples were disassembled into a full list of opcodes using IDA Pro 7.0 (IDA), a powerful tool 
that supports scripting, function tracing, instruction tracing and instruction logging. Scripts 
were also used to extract the opcodes from the IDA Pro output, which contains a great deal 
of other irrelevant information. To avoid overfitting and “noise” in the training set, opcodes 
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were limited to those most commonly represented: for example, for 30 unique opcodes, the 
29 most common listed were selected, and a unique symbol was allocated to each. Later, a 
different symbol was allocated to all the remaining less represented opcodes, for a total of 30 
unique symbols. However, the exact number of symbols depends on factors such as the 
algorithm used or the type of dataset; the value was always picked that gave us the best 
accuracy in classification. 
A very similar approach was used to extract sequences of Application Programming Interface 
(API) calls, which are provided by Microsoft Windows to facilitate requests for services from 
the operating system (Ahmed, et al., 2009). Each API call has a distinct name, a set of 
arguments and a return value. However, only API call names were collected, while arguments 
and return values were discarded. Other features, such as n-grams, were extracted directly 
from the binary files using Python scripts. However, the training of models on dynamic 
features always relied on dynamically extracted API calls, though this used IDA Pro not just as 
a disassembler, but also as a debugger. In fact, IDA Pro has integrated features to deal with 
anti-debugging techniques introduced by malware creators to avoid detection. Furthermore, 
due to the Universal PE Unpacker plug-in introduced in IDA Pro since version 4.9, it can also 
deal with malware code that has been packed (IDA). 
In addition to IDA Pro, Buster Sandbox Analyzer (BSA) was also used: this tracks actions 
executed by a monitored program such as register, file-system and port changes. It runs in a 
sandbox to protect the system from infection, executing potentially malicious software for a 
fixed amount of time while logging all API calls that occur. These recorded API calls are then 
used to form a dynamic API call sequence for each executable file used in the experiments. 
Few other external tools are also used, and more details are furnished in the relevant sections 














This Section gives a brief introduction to the malware detection problem, analyzing different 
conventional detection techniques prior to introducing the machine learning algorithms that 
form the central pillar of this research work.  
This Section is not intended to be fully complete. However, more details can be found in the 
references and the papers listed in Table 1. 
 
3.1 Malware detection  
Several techniques have been applied to the challenging problem of detecting malicious 
software, but the most widely used is signature scanning or signature detection (Aycock, 
2006). Since it relies on pattern matching, the easiest way to perform this type of detection 
is to collect a string of bits from a malware sample and store it in a repository. When this 
string is found as part of a file, we have a match and (even though false positives are not 
unlikely) we can classify the file as infected. A variety of different pattern-matching algorithms 
can be used to achieve this goal.  Although this technique has several advantages, such as 
being efficient and easy to implement, it has some crucial drawbacks. Signature scanning is 
only able to detect a malware file that has previously been analyzed and from which a 
sequence of bits has been collected. Furthermore, considering that the sequence of bits in an 
executable file not wholly random, it is subject to false positives when the same sequence is 
found in a non-infected file. This is due to the generalization problem for which the same 
signature can indicate a multiple subset of sequences extracted from different files, not 
necessarily malicious. It is also relatively simple to defeat with even a weak form of code 
morphing. It is important to note that machine learning based techniques are also affected 
by false positives. In this case, the generalization is described as generality of the malware 
model used by the algorithm. This particular problem is described more thoroughly in Section 
9. 
Another type of detection is anomaly detection, or behavior-based detection (Stamp, 2011). 
This aims to find any chunks of bit-sequences which are out of the ordinary and classifies them 
as potential malware. This type of detection is not normally robust enough as a standalone 
detection system, and it is usually combined with signature detection. Differentiating 
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between usual and unusual is the fundamental challenge. However, this technique has one 
significant advantage over the signature-based ones, i.e., the ability to detect new, 
undiscovered, malware. Analogies with Intrusion Detection Systems are straightforward, 
especially in terms of potential drawbacks, such as the necessity for the model to change 
according to new legit behavior, that could be used as an attack vector for a patient attacker. 
Although the description of these types of attack is outside the scope of this thesis, more 
details can be found in (Stamp, 2011) and (Corona I., 2013). 
Change detection is another technique of interest (Stamp, 2011). For example, a virus would 
add its payload to an executable file to take advantage of its execution rights in the system. 
This causes the original file’s structure to be modified in a manner that can be detected. As a 
defence against this, hashes could be generated from all the infectable resources in the 
system, and before executing or accessing their content, a new hash is computed from the 
file and compared with the previously stored hash (Stamp, 2011). If the file has been infected, 
a change in the hash value should appear. Further analyses would then be required by other 
detection techniques, such as signature detection.  
Furthermore, other disadvantages are introduced, predominantly the increased number of 
false positives since the majority of the files in a system change because of non-malicious 
behavior. A legit behavior that would be considered suspicious by this technique, hence 
flooding the system with needless red flags. 
 
3.2 Machine learning for malware detection 
The approaches described in the previous Section have crucial drawbacks since they all, in a 
way or another, rely on signature detection as a final means of detection. However, malware 
detection can also be based on statistical properties derived from program features allowing   
a different category of detection techniques based on machine learning. These have the 
potential ability to detect malware samples even in the presence of relatively intrusive code 
morphing or other forms of obfuscation. However, while techniques such as instruction 
permutation (which modifies the order of the instructions without changing the original 
intended behavior) are not able to hide the pattern left by the morphing engine, some 
malware obfuscation techniques could introduce substantial problems (Stamp, 2011). For 
example, one particularly useful obfuscation technique is “dead code insertion”, where 
snippets of code are added to the body of the malware file to skew the statistical properties 
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of the original list of instructions. When the injected code is taken from benign files, it 
becomes particularly challenging detecting such modified samples.  
There are two main approaches to the building of machine learning models: the first is “static 
analysis”, which is based on static features extracted directly from the samples without 
executing them, and the second, “dynamic analysis” is based on dynamic characteristics that 
are extrapolated during the sample execution. Examples of the information obtainable from 
the static analysis include opcodes sequences, control flow graphs, and binary n-grams, while 
patterns of information that can be obtained by dynamic analysis include API calls, system 
calls, and registry changes. More information on the application of machine learning models 
in the field of malware detection can be found in (Stamp, 2017). 
Some examples of successful machine learning algorithms in the field of malware detection 
are Hidden Markov Models and Support Vector Machines which are briefly described in 
Section 4.1 and Section 4.3. Other examples are k-nearest neighbors, random forests and 
convolutional neural networks, introduced in 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. All these 




Malware is defined as software that is intended to damage computers and computer systems 
without the knowledge of the owner. Signature-based malware detection is effective in many 
cases, but fails to detect advanced threats, such as metamorphic malware. Machine learning 
techniques have been used to effectively detect metamorphic malware, and other 
challenging classes of malicious code (Stamp, 2017). Such models are often trained using 
static features, such as opcode sequences and byte 𝑛𝑛-grams. Static features are preferable 
since allow to apply the detection mechanism without executing the files for a less intrusive 
detection. For this reason, it is more likely to encounter several malware families that 
concentrate their obfuscation strategies to defeat static based analysis. Therefore, 
dynamically extracted features are more informative and allow to build more robust machine 
learning models. In the next Section, a detection technique based on dynamic features is 
proposed and, subsequently, several static based approaches (based either on machine 
learning algorithms or ad-hoc methods) are introduced with the aim to find the best 
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4 Algorithms  
 
 
The majority of the experiments described in the subsequent sections mainly focus on Hidden 
Markov Models (HMMs), which were trained on malware samples and later used to test 
putative infected files. That is, the scores obtained from HMM (and similarly from PHMM) 
were used to classify the individual samples based on the given threshold. For example, the 
model was trained on a specific malware family and later used to classify between samples of 
such family and non-infected files. A description of the HMM algorithm is given in Section 4.1 
and more details can be found in (Stamp, 2018)). Another particularly useful algorithm is 
Support Vector Machine (Section 4.3) which has proven to help boost classification scores 
(Section 8.2). In a specific set of experiments (Section 6) called zero-day tests, clustering 
techniques were applied to detect undiscovered malware samples. A description of the 
clustering algorithms used is given in Section 4.4. All the remaining algorithms used in our 
experiments are described in the respective research works and relative references.  
 
4.1 Hidden Markov Models 
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical model that can be used to build a machine 
learning technique that relies on a discrete hill climb (Stamp, 2018). That is, a re-estimation 
process that improves the model by modifying the parameters. It has been widely and 
successfully used to solve a variety of problems in several fields, such as speech recognition 
(Rabiner, 1989), artificial intelligence (Ghahramani, 2001), and malware detection (Wong, et 
al., 2006). 
HMM includes a Markov model that cannot itself be directly observed, though, a collection 
of observations that are probabilistically related to the Markov process can be used to create 
a set of discrete probability distributions that binds the observable information to the hidden 
one. The following notation is used for an HMM (Stamp, 2018): 
 
T = length of the observation sequence 
N = number of states in the model 
M = number of observation symbols 
Q = {𝑞𝑞0, 𝑞𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞𝑞𝐹𝐹−1}  = distinct states of the Markov process 
V = {0, 1, … ,𝑀𝑀− 1} = set of possible observations 
A = state transition probabilities 
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B = observation probability matrix 
𝜋𝜋 = initial state distribution 
𝒪𝒪 = (𝒪𝒪0,𝒪𝒪1, … ,𝒪𝒪𝑇𝑇−1) = observation sequence 
 
 
A generic Hidden Markov Model is illustrated in Figure 4. The part above the dotted line is the 
state sequence, while below the line is the observation sequence. While we can observe the 
observation sequence, the state sequence remains hidden. However, through the probability 
distribution contained in the B matrix, we can associate the observable information to the 
hidden one.  
  
 
Figure 4 - A generic HMM 
 
This algorithm allows three different problems to be solved: 
Problem 1: Given the model 𝜆𝜆 = (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝜋𝜋) and an observable sequence 𝒪𝒪, determine 𝑇𝑇(𝒪𝒪|𝜆𝜆). 
Given an observation sequence, we can use model 𝜆𝜆 to score how closely related the two are 
to each other. 
Problem 2: Given the model 𝜆𝜆 = (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝜋𝜋) and an observable sequence 𝒪𝒪, determine the 
most likely hidden state sequence X. That is, we can uncover the most likely hidden states. 
Problem 3: Given an observation sequence 𝒪𝒪 and the dimensions N and M, determine the 
model 𝜆𝜆 such that it maximizes the probability of 𝒪𝒪. That is, given an observation sequence, 
we can train a model that best fits with such sequence.  
Considering the problem of malware detection, we build a machine learning algorithm 
applying the solution to Problem 3 to train an HMM to recognize the samples of a given 
malware family. This training phase is based on a collection of features extracted from 
malware samples belonging to the same malware family. Then, given an unknown sample, 
we apply the solution to Problem 1 to score it against the trained model. A set of scores are 
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thus collected. If the unknown samples belong to the given malware family, we expect to 
obtain a higher score than the one from a sample that does not belong to that specific family.  
Following, a description of the algorithms used to solve the three problems. Even further 
reading, plus a pseudo-code version, can be found in (Stamp, 2018). 
4.1.1 Solution to Problem 1 
Let 𝜆𝜆 = (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝜋𝜋) be a given model and let 𝑂𝑂 = (𝑂𝑂0,𝑂𝑂1, . . . ,𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇−1) be a series of observations. 
We want to find the probability of the 𝑂𝑂 given 𝜆𝜆, or 𝑇𝑇(𝑂𝑂|𝜆𝜆). To find 𝑇𝑇(𝑂𝑂|𝜆𝜆), the so-called 
forward algorithm, or 𝛼𝛼-pass, is used. For 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1, . . . ,𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖𝑖 = 0,1, . . . ,𝐹𝐹 − 1, define 
 
 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑇𝑇(𝑂𝑂0,𝑂𝑂1, . . . ,𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖|𝜆𝜆)     ( 1 ) 
Then 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖) is the probability of the partial observation sequence up to time 𝑡𝑡, where the 
underlying Markov process is in state 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. However,  𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖) can be computed 
recursively as follows, therefore, the forward algorithm only requires a smaller number of 
multiplications.  
4.1.2 Solution to Problem 2 
We want to find the most likely state sequence given the model 𝜆𝜆 =  (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝜋𝜋) and an 
observations sequence 𝑂𝑂. Specifically, we want to find a state sequence so to maximize the 
expected number of correct states. To obtain this goal, we first define the backward 
algorithm, or 𝛽𝛽-pass. This is analogous to the 𝛼𝛼-pass discussed above, except that it starts at 
the end and works back toward the beginning. For 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1, . . . ,𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖𝑖 =  0,1, . . . ,𝐹𝐹 − 1, 
define 
 
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖)  = 𝑇𝑇(𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡+1,𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡+2, . . . ,𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇−1|𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝜆𝜆)     ( 2 ) 
Then, for 𝑡𝑡 = 0,1, . . . ,𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖𝑖 =  0,1, . . . ,𝐹𝐹 − 1, we define 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖|𝑂𝑂, 𝜆𝜆) as 
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖)  =
𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖)
𝑇𝑇�𝑂𝑂�𝜆𝜆�  . From the definition of 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖) it follows that the most likely state at time 𝑡𝑡 is 
the state 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 for which 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖) is maximum, where the maximum is taken over the index 𝑖𝑖. 
4.1.3 Solution to Problem 3 
We want to find the elements of 𝐴𝐴, 𝐵𝐵  and 𝜋𝜋, subject to the row stochastic condition. For 𝑡𝑡 =




    𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗)  = 𝑇𝑇(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗|𝑂𝑂, 𝜆𝜆)    ( 3 ) 
Thus, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) is the probability of being in state 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡 and transiting to state 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 at time 
𝑡𝑡 + 1.  
Given the 𝛾𝛾 and di-gamma we verify that the model 𝜆𝜆 =  (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝜋𝜋) can be re-estimated as 
follows.  




     𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =
∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗)𝑇𝑇−2𝑡𝑡=0
∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇−2𝑡𝑡=0
      ( 4 ) 






     ( 5 ) 
 
The numerator in (4) can be seen to give the expected number of transitions from state 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 to 
state 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗, while the denominator is the expected number of transitions from 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 to any state. 
Thus, the ratio is the probability of transiting from state 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 to state 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗. The numerator in (5) 
is the expected number of times the model is in state 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗 with observation 𝑘𝑘, while the 
denominator is the expected number of times the model is in state 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗. Thus, the ratio is the 
probability of observing symbol 𝑘𝑘, given that the model is in state 𝑞𝑞𝑗𝑗.  
Re-estimation is an iterative process and in our case it starts initializing the model 𝜆𝜆 =
 (𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝜋𝜋) with random values so that 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ≈
1
𝐹𝐹
 , 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≈
1
𝐹𝐹





4.2 Profile Hidden Markov Models 
A generic view of a PHMM is shown in Figure 5. A significant difference between PHMM and 
HMM is that while PHMM includes match (𝑀𝑀), insert (𝐼𝐼), and delete (𝐷𝐷) states, a standard 
HMM does not allow insertions or deletions. Also, a PHMM explicitly accounts for positional 
information within sequences, whereas an HMM does not. A PHMM can be viewed as a 
generalization of an HMM that take positional information into account. PHMM scores were 
obtained by generating pairwise alignments with the sequences of API calls for a given 
malware family. This step allows the construction of the Multiple Sequence Alignment (MSA). 
However, some pre-processing is required before we can construct pairwise alignments. The 
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general approach used by (Attaluri, et al., 2009) were followed, where the API calls are sorted 
by frequency of occurrence. 
 
Figure 5 - Profile Hidden Markov Model 
 
Attention was focused on the top 36 API calls, which constitute at least 99.8% of the total API 
calls for each family tested. The remaining ones were mapped to a single “other” state. The 
next step involves the creation of a substitution matrix and a gap penalty function. The Feng-
Doolittle algorithm (Feng, et al., 1987) was used to create the MSA from the pairwise 
alignments, from which the PHMM was built. Finally, using the forward algorithm, the 
sequences were scored against the PHMM.  Further details on the forward algorithm can be 
found in (Durbin, et al., 1988). Whereas, for more information about the specific pairwise 
alignment and MSA construction strategies, see (Vemparala, 2015). 
 
4.3 Support Vector Machines 
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) (Cortes, et al., 1995) are a class of supervised learning 
technique used for binary classification.  Thus, given labeled linearly separable training data, 
the algorithm separates such data using a hyperplane, where the separation between the two 
classes of data in the training set is maximized. An SVM also works in higher dimensions: by 
moving the problem to a higher dimension, the data points tend to be more easily separated, 
and hence we have a better chance of finding a separating hyperplane. Computing higher 
dimensions is not a trivial process, and it is implemented using a so-called kernel “trick”. This 
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“trick” is the process by which we transform the data into a higher dimension, in such a 
manner that they do become linearly separable. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Maximizing the margin 
 
 
Figure 7 - Transformation from 2 to 3 dimensions 
 
For example, Figure 6, shows a separating hyperplane that maximizes the margin. On the left 
side of Figure 7, a case where this cannot be done is described. On the right side of the same 
Figure, instead, a representation is shown of how the kernel “trick” can manipulate such data 
to easily construct a hyperplane that separates the two data sets, showing the benefit of 
transforming to a higher dimension. Several alternative tricks are applicable, and tests need 
to be done to select the most beneficial for the given experiment. 
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4.3.1 Feature reduction for SVM 
It was necessary to collect several features from the dataset but selecting too many of these 
features proved to be detrimental to the scores. It was therefore decided to apply a feature 
reduction step before training and testing models. Some features act as noise and it is not 
uncommon to obtain better results with a reduced feature set. 
One technique used to reduce the number of features is based on Support Vector 
Classification (SVC) (Stamp, 2017), a multiclass version of SVM . The first step is to apply 
recursive feature elimination (RFE) (Stamp, 2017): compute a linear SVC, eliminate the feature 
with the smallest weight and then recompute the linear SVC. The process continues until only 
one single feature remains, where this feature is the strongest in terms of its contribution to 
the classification.  
Another of such techniques is called univariate feature selection (UFS) (Stamp, 2017). Where, 
the accuracies obtained from several SVCs are used to rank all the features. In this case, one 
SVC is built for each feature, in order to test them individually.  
After testing with these two approaches, the one that gave the best tradeoff between the 
number of features used and accuracy was selected. Generally, RFE was somewhat more 
reliable, as it accounts for the interactions between features. 
 
4.4 Clustering techniques 
Clustering is an unsupervised classification mechanism that is designed to categorize data. 
There is a large variety of different algorithms that can be applied and in (Pai, et al., 2017) and 
(Usha, et al., 2016), the K-means and Expectation Maximization (EM) clustering techniques 
were used. 
Expectation-Maximization (EM) is one of the most popular clustering techniques in use today. 
Given a set of m data points, the algorithm partitions the data into a specified number of 
mutually exclusive clusters. More details about EM can be found in (Do, et al., 2008). 
K-means is another example of a clustering technique that differs from EM in some 
implementation details. K-means is an example of an EM technique where distances are 
measured directly between data points instead of measuring them based on probability 




4.5 k-Nearest Neighbor 
The k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) algorithm is a supervised learning technique that requires 
labeled training data (Stamp, 2017). In 𝑘𝑘-NN we classify a point 𝑥𝑥 based on the 𝑘𝑘 points in the 
training set that are nearest to it. In k-NN, we classify a sample based on a majority vote of 
the k nearest samples in the training set. However, variations exist, such as weighting the 
“votes” based on the relative frequencies of the training samples, particularly useful when 
there is an imbalance in the training samples, or weighting them based on their distance from 
the sample that we are classifying.  An important advantage of using 𝑘𝑘-NN is that it involves 
no training as the labeled training data is all that the algorithm needs. In fact, all the necessary 
computations are left to the testing phase only. In Section 9.1, 𝑘𝑘-NN was implemented using 
python to build classifiers based on 𝑛𝑛-gram frequencies as feature. 
 
4.6 Random Forests 
Random forests are a generalization of decision trees (Stamp, 2017). Random forests use a 
process called “bagging” to construct multiple decision trees. In this approach, a random 
subset of the observations and a random subset of the features is selected to construct 
multiple decision trees.  
For classification, the outputs of all these decision trees are combined using techniques such 
as the majority vote of each individual outcome from the decision trees to get a single 
classification. Relying on a random subset of the observations and features, random forests 
reduce the tendency of decision trees to overfit. In 9.1, scikit-learn Python library (Pedregosa, 
et al., 2011) was used to implement random forests using n-grams frequencies as feature. 
 
4.7 Convolutional Neural Networks 
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) can be described as a specialized case of the regular 
neural networks, where, besides implementing a set of learnable weights and biases, the 
overall architecture is designed to be used for problems involving image recognition. This 
assumption helps encoding properties that permit a more efficient application of the 
network, such as simplifying the forward function and reducing the number of parameters in 
the network. More details about the process involved can be found at (Con20). In 7.2, CNN 





Boosting is the process of combining multiple weak classifiers to obtain a stronger classifier. 
To be combined, a classifier must obtain in classification a result marginally better than 
flipping a coin. In  8.1, one technique to combine these classifiers was used, that is, “adaptive 
boost” or AdaBoost (Stamp, 2017). The basic concept is theoretically straightforward: 
AdaBoost selects the best classifiers at each iteration among those available. Such an 
algorithm must improve more than the others on the overall accuracy of the new combined 
classifier. In other words, AdaBoost greedily selects a classifier that does the most to improve 
on the current iteration of the constructed classifier. 
More details about this approach can be found in (Stamp, 2017). However, it is worth noticing 
that AdaBoost is not a hill climb. That is, at any given iteration, the resulting classifier may be 




The algorithms here briefly described are used in the subsequent Sections and compared 
against ad-hoc techniques to select the best static based detection approach. In particular, 
HMMs are often used as a means of comparison among the several approaches, or are also 
used to generate scores that are directly integrated in a clustering based set of experiments 
(Section 6). Particular interest is placed on SVMs, that, after obtaining satisfying results 
compared to ad-hoc algorithms (Section 7), are used as a meta-classifier to boost up the 
classification accuracy of our static techniques (Section 8). This, specifically, will allow to reach 
the perfect detection (based on statically trained machine learning models) that is the 














5 Preliminary experiments 
 
 
Before starting the experiments, it was necessary to find the best approach to training and 
testing for the machine learning models. The very first set of tests compared the effectiveness 
of four different training and testing strategies based on dynamic and static features, plus 
combinations in two hybrid approaches. Further experiments were used to analyze the results 
of a dynamic based machine learning model, i.e. a model trained using dynamic features. 
Fortunately, this led immediately to a perfect detection against the challenging dataset and 
it was therefore decided to use these results as a baseline for further experiments using static 
features. Since static analysis is more efficient, reaching the same level of accuracy as with 
dynamic analysis could be considered a significant achievement. However, dynamic elements 
are more accurate and more complicated to obfuscate in comparison with static ones. To 
prove the effectiveness of static models, Section 6 introduces zero-day experiments based on 
detecting unknown malware samples exclusively using static features. The intent was to find 
a valid machine learning algorithm able to achieve good accuracy even in this challenging 
scenario. In Section 7, to understand if machine learning algorithms can indeed offer more 
than other approaches, they were compared with other four different static methods. Finally, 
in Section 8, to increase the detection rate, static based experiments were introduced where 
machine learning scores are combined to obtain better accuracy. It was shown that this 
particular method reaches the same level of detection as the one obtained by applying 
dynamic analysis.  
The remainder of this Section is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the experiments 
used for training-testing the models and comparing them among themselves to select the 
most beneficial for the machine learning models. Section 5.2 introduces the purely dynamic 
approach, where Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHHMs) can achieve perfect detection in all 
tests.   
 
5.1 A comparison of static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis for malware detection 
Static detection involves trying to classify the samples without executing them using only 
static features, such as opcodes or byte n-grams. On the other hand, the dynamic analysis 
relies on running the samples to collect dynamic features, such as API calls runtime 
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sequences. While dynamic analysis produces, on average, a more accurate classification, 
static analysis is much faster. 
Both approaches described in our work (Damodaran, et al., 2017) were tested, along with 
hybrid models which combined static and dynamic analysis. The first of these trained on 
dynamic features and tested on static ones, while the second trained on static features and 
tested on dynamic ones.  
Purely static analysis (static training and static testing) has proved to be a reliable form of 
analysis in numerous researches. For example, in (Attaluri, et al., 2009), static features have 
been used to feed Profile Hidden Markov Models in the difficult task of classifying 
metamorphic malware samples, while (Deshpande, et al., 2014) and (Jidigam, et al., 2015) 
produced results using Principal Component Analysis. Other examples are (Singh, et al., 2016), 
which used Support Vector Machines, and (Pai, et al., 2017), which employed clustering 
algorithms (see Section 8.2  and Section 6.1).  
5.1.1 Related Work 
Previous work based on machine learning application on hybrid approach is discussed here. 
In (Choi, et al., 2012), a framework for classification of malware using both static and dynamic 
analysis is proposed. The approach used to define features of malware has been called 
Malware DNA (Mal-DNA). The heart of this technique is a debugging-based behavior monitor 
and analyser that extracts dynamic characteristics. Another work on the topic is (Eskandari, 
et al., 2013), where the authors develop and test a tool called HDM-Analyser that uses both 
static analysis and dynamic analysis in the training phase, but performs static analysis only in 
the testing phase. Differently from these previous works, the set of experiments described in 
this Section focuses on directly comparing different hybrid training/testing combinations 
relying on the same dataset, scoring techniques and features as the previous ones. 
5.1.2 Experimental setup 
For our experiments, four different combinations of static and dynamic features were 
analyzed: static/static, dynamic/dynamic, hybrid static/dynamic, and hybrid dynamic/static. 
To compare them, an HMM was trained on each case in two different sets of experiments: 
the first based on API calls sequences and the second on opcodes sequences. The tests 
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focused on six different malware families taken from the Malicia dataset described in Section 
2.1: Harebot, Security Shield, Smart HDD, Winwebsec, Zbot, and ZeroAccess. 
For the hybrid experiments, to ensure that the features extracted dynamically were 
compatible with the ones extracted statically (and vice versa), only the common features that 
were obtained from both approaches were taken in consideration to train the models. For 
example, in Figure 9 we observe the discrepancy between the unique opcodes extracted 
dynamically and the ones extracted statically.  
5.1.3 Results 
The four approaches were compared in terms of AUC (Area under the Receiver Operator 
Curve, see Section 2) shown in Figure 8, where a purely dynamic approach and a purely static 
approach consistently yields the best results. It is also clear that the incompatibility between 
the features used to train and the features extracted in the testing phase causes a degradation 
of the effectiveness of the hybrid techniques. In fact, the hybrid approach consisting of static 
training and dynamic scoring produces worse results compared to all the other strategies for 
almost all the malware family tested.  
 
 
Figure 8 - ROC results for API call sequence 
 
Next, opcode sequences for training and scoring were used. Figure 9 shows the number of 
unique opcodes in the static and dynamic cases for each family, which leads to the conclusion 
that scoring in the dynamic/static case is complicated by the many opcodes which appear 
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scoring that are not part of the training set. To avoid this complication, it was decided that 
the opcodes not appearing in the training set should be ignored. Figure 10 shows the AUC 
results. The scores, in this case, are not as strong as the ones obtained using API calls 
sequences. As in Figure 8, the purely dynamic approach yields excellent results in all cases, 
while in four cases the purely static approach attains less accuracy than the hybrid approach. 
However, unlike the API call sequence models, the static/static and the hybrid dynamic/static 
case yield results that are roughly equivalent.  
 










These experiments have shown that for API calls and opcode sequences, a fully dynamic 
strategy is generally the most effective. However, it is essential to consider that dynamic 
analysis is usually costly in comparison to static analysis. While at the training phase, this 
added cost is not a significant issue, being mostly a one-time work, the scoring phase would 
likely be impractical, especially where it is necessary to scan a large number of files. 
Applying a hybrid dynamic/static approach could potentially overcome this issue, since after 
dynamic training, we would get all the benefits of static testing. Unfortunately, this strategy 
has not been particularly successful: for API call sequences, results were consistently worse 
with the hybrid dynamic/static approach than with a fully static one. For opcode sequences, 
even though in four cases the results for this hybrid approach have been slightly better than 
the fully static one, the obtained results were not consistent enough against the whole set of 
malware families. Consequently, when hybrid approaches are proposed, it would be advisable 
to test the results against comparable fully dynamic and fully static techniques. 
A fully static approach based on API calls was nearly as practical as a purely dynamic approach 
in most cases. However, as shown in Figure 10, the results have not been impressive for some 
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families. This outcome is likely due to the nature of the obfuscation techniques employed by 
malware writers. Current obfuscation techniques are likely to have a significant effect on 
opcode sequences, but little attention is paid to API calls. Nonetheless, API call sequences 
could likely be obfuscated with some additional effort, in which case the advantage of relying 
on API call sequences for detection might diminish significantly  (Damodaran, et al., 2017). 
In conclusion, our experimental results in this phase indicate that a straightforward hybrid 
approach is unlikely to be superior to fully dynamic detection. Moreover, even in comparison 
to fully static detection, the hybrid dynamic/static approach did not offer consistent 
improvement.  
In Section 5.2, more successful purely dynamic experiments are introduced and, as 
confirmation, a comparison with the purely static approach is repeated. The next Sections, 
and the remainder of this document focuses on experiments in the purely static domain, 
abandoning both the hybrid strategies. 
 
5.2 Malware Detection Using Dynamic Birthmarks 
These experiments were designed to compare directly the purely dynamic and purely static 
approaches using two different detection algorithms. In our work (Vemparala, et al., 2016), 
two different techniques to classify malware samples were applied based on dynamic 
features: Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHHMs). 
Following the promising results of Section 5.1, both models were trained on sequences of API 
calls. 
The term “software birthmarks” was used to describe the set of possible characteristics that 
can be derived from a specific software file. For the case of an executable file, it describes all 
the properties that can be extracted without executing it, for example opcode sequences. In 
contrast, dynamic birthmarks are characteristics that can usually be retrieved during the 
program execution, for example sequences of API calls. A description of how HMMs works is 
given in Section 4.1.   
5.2.1 Related Work 
Although both HMM-based analysis (Wong, et al., 2006) and PHMM-based analysis (Attaluri, 
et al., 2009) have been previously applied to the malware detection problem, no direct 
comparison of static and dynamic techniques was tested before.  In particular, in (Wong, et 
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al., 2006) the effectiveness of HMMs for detecting challenging classes of metamorphic 
malware based on opcode sequences has been demonstrated.  While, in (Attaluri, et al., 
2009),  the use of Profile Hidden Markov models is analyzed in detecting metamorphic 
malware based on static opcode sequences. This approach works well against certain classes 
of metamorphic malware but is less effective when the blocks of code are shifted relatively 
far apart. While PHMMs trained on static data did not prove to be particularly strong for 
malware detection, in our work we show that PHMMs are an extremely powerful tool for 
malware detection based on dynamic birthmarks. 
5.2.2 Results 
These experiments used the same dataset samples as those in Section 5.1 with the addition 
of a single family, that is, Cridex. In Figure 11 shows all the results per each family using both 
HMM and PHMM. Note that the HMM results are separated in Static HMM and Dynamic 
HMM based on the type of features used, respectively, opcode sequences and API calls. 
HMMs based on static opcode sequences have performed well against one family in 
particular, namely Smart HDD, for which AUC was 0.996. However, it returned inconsistent 
results with the other families, the lowest AUC score being 0.596 obtained with Cridex. 
 
 
Figure 11 - PHMM versus HMMs 
 
On the other hand, dynamic HMM outperforms the static HMM in almost every case. The 
average AUC for the dynamic HMM cases was 0.976, whereas for the static HMM cases it was 
0.785. This result clearly shows the advantage of dynamic birthmarks. Regarding PHMMs, the 
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number of sequences used to train was a critical parameter: Table 2 describes the various 
results obtained through cross-validation, where “group 𝑛𝑛" means that the PHMM was 
trained using 𝑛𝑛 sequences. In each case it was possible to achieve an AUC of 1.0, and once 
such a result was attained there was no need for further experimentation. 
 





These experiments have shown the efficacy of malware classification using HMMs built from 
API calls. Furthermore, it has been proved that PHMMs, based too on dynamic API call 
sequences, outperform the HMMs in every case. Thus, the positional information in API call 
sequences is highly effective, whereas the positional information in opcode sequences is 
much less so. 
These results were used to establish the baseline for further experiments. Dynamic analysis 
using PHMM reached perfect detection in all cases, while dynamic analysis using HMM 
reached an average accuracy of 0.976. Both dynamic approaches are impressive, but they 
introduce the overhead required to extract the API call sequences from each sample. The 
more challenging problems of applying static detection, such as zero-day experiment, are 
addressed in Section 6. Moreover, to increase the score of our static approaches and, thus, 
get as close as possible to the results obtained using dynamic detection strategies, different 
boosting techniques were introduced, and are covered in Section 8. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
After these set of preliminary experiments, we found that hybrid approaches (in particular, 
dynamic training and static testing) were not particularly effective. Thus, the subsequent 
experiments are all based on purely dynamic or purely static features. Furthermore, perfect 
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classification was reached applying PHMM trained on dynamically extracted sequences of API 
calls, and therefore it will provide a baseline against which the performance of subsequent 




























6 Zero-day experiments 
 
 
This Section introduces the challenging problem of zero-day detection, where the malicious 
samples belong to malware families for which no model has been created yet. In other words, 
zero-day malware is a new undiscovered threat. Clustering techniques were chosen as the 
main approach in this type of experiments, since these are widely used in data exploration, 
where information about data itself is poorly understood (Babu, et al., 2012). This 
characteristic makes clustering a perfect candidate to detect new undiscovered malware files.    
The following parts of this Section compare two clustering algorithms: Expectation 
Maximization and K-means (Section 6.1), with the goal to find the most profitable tuning 
between dimensionality (i.e., number of models used for clustering), and the number of 
clusters, with respect to the accuracy of the clustering in a set of unsupervised experiments. 
Later, Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are introduced by training their models on compiler 
code instead of malware code to simulate the case of unknown malicious samples. A 
comparison between SVM and supervised clustering is also proposed (Section 6.2), proving 
how effective SVM is in combining scores.  
 
6.1 Clustering for malware classification 
In preparation for the experiments on detecting zero-day malware, it was necessary to 
determine the most effective clustering algorithm. For this reason, in our work (Pai, et al., 
2017) clusters were computed and compared using the algorithms K-means and Expectation 
Maximization (specifically Gaussian mixture model), where the underlying scores were based 
on Hidden Markov Models. Specifically, the comparison focused on finding the best 
combination between the number of models used for clustering (dimensions) and the number 
of clusters produced.  
6.1.1 Related Work 
Clustering using the K-means algorithm is the focus of the work in (Annachhatre, et al., 2014), 
where, as in our work, malware samples are scored using multiple HMMs trained on distinct 
compilers code. Although none of the malware families were used to train the models, the 
classification results are good, indicating that clustering may be a useful tool for classifying 
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previously unknown malware. Our work, and specifically the experiments described in this 
Section, can be viewed as an extension of the work in (Annachhatre, et al., 2014). However, 
the main goal is to compare K-means and EM clustering in the context of malware 
classification and prepare the base for the experiments in Section 6.2. 
6.1.2 Experimental setup 
Still relying on the same set of datasets described in Section 2.1, investigations focused on 
five of the families present in the dataset introduced in Section 2.1: namely Zbot, ZeroAccess, 
Smart HDD, Winwebsec and NGVSK. The purpose of this experiment was to find the best 
clustering algorithm to classify each tested sample in the corresponding malware family.  
As in the previous static experiments, all training and scoring was based on extracted opcode 
sequences. The process assigns scores to the families which are used to build the clusters 
using HMM. For instance, from each sample (regardless of the malware family to which 
belong) we obtain several scores from the various HMM models (one per each family). These 
scores represent the features of the sample that is then introduced to the clustering 
algorithm.  That is, an HMM is created for each family and then, using the corresponding 
HMM scores, clusters were generated using both K-means and the EM clustering algorithms. 
Finally, the files were classified based on the resulting clusters.  
Two different classification schemes were used here. One was based on the “silhouette 
coefficient”, the other based solely on the purity of the clusters, a metrics that measures the 
ratio of each type of sample per each cluster (a purity of 100% indicates that the cluster 
contains only one type of data) (Stamp, 2017). More details about these schemes can be 
found in our work (Pai, et al., 2017). 
6.1.3 Results 
Varying the number of clusters from 2 to 10, and the number of dimensions from 2 to 5, it 
was found that EM outperforms K-means. In particular, as the number of clusters and 




Figure 12 - Purity scores for EM and K-means clustering. (a) 2-dimensional, (b) 3-dimensional, (c) 4-dimensional, (d) 5-
dimensional 
 
Figure 12 shows the results based on the purity score, indicating how the distance of the EM 
scores from the K-means scores increases with the number of dimensions. More experiments 
and results can be found in (Pai, et al., 2017). 
Another critical outcome of the experiments is that the overhead introduced by this approach 
is minimal. This characteristic represents a significant benefit of the clustering approach in 
relation to other static techniques. In fact, after the training phase, the clusters are known 
and, hence, to score a sample, HMM score must be computed along with the distance to the 
centroids (K-means) or probabilities (EM). If the number of clusters remains relatively small, 
this step has no significant impact upon the overall computation required.  
After these preliminary set of experiments, in Section 6.2 attention was focused on the 




6.2 Clustering versus SVM for malware detection 
After proving that Expectation Maximization (EM) obtains better accuracy in classifying 
malware samples in their respective families than K-means (Section 6.1), it was decided to 
test this technique against the more challenging problem of classifying previously unknown 
malware in our work (Usha, et al., 2016). The term zero-day malware is used to describe a 
type of malware that is still undisclosed and for which there is no existent signature or model 
applied for detection. To provide a point of reference for our clustering results, Support 
Vector Machines (SVMs) were used, where the SVM is trained on the malware family to 
classify.  
6.2.1 Related Work 
To generate the HMM models, the tools developed in (Annachhatre, et al., 2014) and (Austin, 
et al., 2013) were used. The overall implementation is followed, but in our case the same 
HMM scores that we used for clustering were used to train and test the SVM model. Thus, we 
test SVM for combining multiple HMM scores into a single classifier. Also, these SVM 
experiments serve as a sort of control, in the sense of providing results that we can compare 
to our clustering experiments. 
6.2.2 Experimental setup 
As in Section 6.1, all the underlying scores used for the clustering algorithms and SVMs are 
based on HMMs. However, while the dataset was identical to the one used previously (Section 
6.1), a different approach was applied for the case of the SVM experiments. The HMM model 
was trained on each of four different compilers, namely, GCC, MinGW, TurboC, and Clang, 
plus models for handwritten assembly code (TASM) and NGVCK. From these files, seven 
distinct HMMs were obtained, which were used to score each of the malware and benign 
sample files. This operation resulted in a 7-tuple of scores for each file in the test set, which 
were used to generate the clusters. This process gives SVM an understanding of generic 
programming code without revealing any information on the actual malware families to 
detect. This process has been inspired by the work in (Annachhatre, et al., 2014), even though 
the authors relied on clustering experiments only. More details about this procedure can be 
found in our work (Usha, et al., 2016).    
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Furthermore, to simulate the zero-day experiments, three HMM models were obtained, one 
for each of the most represented malware families in the dataset, namely, ZeroAccess, 
Winwebsec, and Zbot. These scores were used to cluster two of the families, which were then 
used to test how accurate the classification of the third family was. The idea behind this 
approach is that the third family simulates an undiscovered malware family potentially 
detectable using a pre-existing model based on different known families. 
6.2.3 Results 
The purpose of these experiments was to determine how well the SVM can distinguish 
between families when using 2 to 4 dimensions of HMM scores. For this reason, an SVM 
model was trained on a subset of Zbot and Winwebsec samples and tested against the 
remaining Zbot and Winwebsec samples. Figure 13 shows the AUC results for these 
experiments using various kernel functions, indicating that SVM is very effective in classifying 
the malware samples.  
To compare SVM with K-means and EM, the 7-tuples of compiler scores were used, with the 
same training and test sets that are used for clustering. However, the training set for the 
clustering algorithms did not contain benign samples, whereas benign samples must be 
explicitly included when training the SVM. Figure 14 shows the comparison in classifying the 
unknown malware family varying the number of dimensions from 2 to 4. There is a clear 
difference in comparison with the previous set of clustering experiments (Section 6.1). Raising 
the number of dimensions to 4 improved the effectiveness of EM, while, up to 3, K-means is 
outperformed by EM in classifying unknown malware samples. More importantly, this shows 
how superior the clustering and SVM scores are, in particular, for the 4-dimensional case. 
Moreover, considering that SVM had the advantage of being trained directly on the given 





Figure 13 - SVM malware score results 
 
 
Figure 14 - Clustering and SVM AUC comparison 
 
In the light of these results, the clustering approach can be recommended as a first line of 
defence against new malware. Also, this technique can be used to automatically filter out new 
malware samples for further analysis, hence, allowing for a faster process of building new 
malware models from unknown threats.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
In this Section, we applied machine learning to the problem of detecting previously unknown 
malware samples, or zero-day. A comparison of two clustering algorithms (K-means and EM) 
was performed in a purely unsupervised form. In this case, several clusters were generated 
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without any prior knowledge of the malware families involved. From these experiments, EM 
appeared to be a stronger candidate for this type of challenge.  
Furthermore, a supervised approach to zero-day detection was tested. To simulate this 
circumstance, we used clustering algorithms to cluster a given number of known families, and 
then we tried to classify samples from a family still unknown to the algorithm by using these 
clusters.  
As a means of comparison, Support Vector Machines were also used. In particular, an SVM 
was trained on code from a given number of compilers and specific assembly code. The results 
were also interesting, especially considering that the SVM model was not aware of the 
malware families code, thus, proving the potential of SVM as a candidate meta-classifier for 
























7 Effectiveness of Machine Learning algorithms 
 
 
After applying machine learning models on opcodes and API calls sequences, attention was 
shifted to different type of approaches to the malware detection problem. The goal here is to 
justify the use of machine learning algorithms by comparing them to other unconventional 
means of detection. One class of approach is applying cryptanalytic techniques to detect 
malware samples (Deshmukh, et al., 2018) that may be able to disclose underlying structures 
in the program code treating it as encrypted text. Another converts binary files into images 
before classifying the malware samples using an artificial neural network (Yajamanam, et al., 
2018), taking advantage from its ability to detect known patterns from image files. Then, an 
ad-hoc method based on function call graphs is introduced (Rajeswaran, et al., 2018) to test 
how analyzing directly the structure of a program compares to machine learning. Finally, 
robust hashing and its characteristic to ignore modifications to the input data becomes the 
base of the last proposed technique (Huang, et al., 2018). 
 
7.1 Vigenère scores for malware detection 
This approach applies cryptanalytic techniques to detect malware in samples. In our work 
(Deshmukh, et al., 2018), two malware scoring techniques based on the classic Vigenère 
cipher were tested. These relied on the index of coincidence (IC), which is used, for example, 
to determine the length of the keyword in a Vigenère ciphertext.  
7.1.1 Related Work 
The novelty of this work is to apply the logic of Vigenère cryptoanalysis to the problem of 
malware detection. This set of experiments is based on the work in (Shanmugam, et al., 2013). 
The authors show that a distance measure based on simple substitution cryptanalysis can 
provide a strong score in the context of malware detection. The analysis in (Srinivasan, 2015) 
extends the simple substitution attack to the case of a cipher that combines simple 
substitution with column transposition. However, differently that in the previous work, the 
cryptanalytic techniques are not applied to ciphertext in our experiments. Instead, these 
techniques are applied to obfuscated malware code. The insight is that many common code 
obfuscation techniques can be viewed as substitutions and permutations at the level of 
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opcodes, and hence such techniques are analogous to operations performed by many types 
of classic ciphers. Thus, a score based on a classic cipher can be viewed as providing a distance 
measure between obfuscated code and some idealized version of the code. For such cipher-
based scores, the idealized version of the code plays the role of plaintext, while the 
obfuscated version plays the role of the ciphertext.  
7.1.2 Scoring Techniques 
Index of Coincidence (IC) is used in our scoring phase. There are two main ways to compute 
the IC, namely, the Kasisky’s Test and the Friedman’s Test, and both were considered in these 
experiments. Furthermore, a score based on a complete cryptanalysis of a Vigenère cipher 
was tested. The IC based score in computed as: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = |𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠|      ( 6 ) 
where 𝜅𝜅𝑓𝑓  is the IC value determined from the opcodes of the given family f and 𝜅𝜅𝑠𝑠 is derived 
from the sample that we want to score. If the sample s belongs to the family f, we expect the 
score to be small, as compared to cases where s does not belong to f. 
Following the steps of the Friedman’s test, the Vigenère keyword length is estimated (note 
that the alphabet statistics are computed on the opcode sequences of the malware family 
samples). That is, we compute: 
 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝜅𝜅𝑓𝑓 – 𝜅𝜅𝑟𝑟
𝜅𝜅𝑠𝑠 – 𝜅𝜅𝑟𝑟
        ( 7 ) 
where 𝜅𝜅𝑟𝑟 is the IC value based on the random case. 
Using the value of L computed from the formula (2) above, we determine the sequence of 
shifts 𝜎𝜎 =  (𝜎𝜎1,𝜎𝜎2, . . . ,𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 ) using the formula: 
 
𝜎𝜎ℓ = 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(ℓ)𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐−1𝑖𝑖=0 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚 𝑠𝑠     ( 8 ) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(ℓ), for 𝑖𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑠𝑠 − 1 and  ℓ =  1, 2, . . . , 𝐿𝐿, is the relative frequency of opcode i 
in the ℓ𝑡𝑡ℎ column, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  is the relative frequency of opcode i in the malware family samples, and 
c is the total number of symbols in the alphabet (in this case it would correspond to the 
number of unique opcodes used in these experiments). 
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To compute the actual score and be consistent with previous work (Shanmugam, et al., 2013)., 
we use the recovered offsets to “decrypt”, then we compare the digraph distribution matrix 
of the putative “decrypt” to the expected digraph distribution matrix for the family. 
Let 𝐷𝐷 =  {𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗} be the normalized digraph distribution matrix corresponding to s, and let 𝐸𝐸 =
 {𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗} be the normalized digraph distribution matrix for the family f . Then the Vigenère score 
is defined as: 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛è𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =  ∑ ∑ |𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗=1𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖=1    ( 9 ) 
If the sample s is similar—in the Vigenère sense—to the elements in the family f, then we 
expect this score to be relatively small. Conversely, in cases where s differs significantly from 
the family f, we expect the score to be relatively large. Further details about these techniques 
can be found in our work (Deshmukh, et al., 2018). 
7.1.3 Results 
The dataset used is still the same defined in Section 2.1, specifically the Malicia and NGVSK 
samples. The results for both proposed scores are given in Figure 15. As a comparison, SSD 
scores are included from (Shanmugam, et al., 2013). and SSCT scores from (Srinivasan, 2015), 
where the SSD scores are based on simple substitution cryptanalysis, while the SSCT scores 
are based on a simple substitution and column transposition.  
 




Figure 15 shows the results of detecting each individual family against benign samples. In 
particular, the Vigenère score outperformed the previous techniques in the particular case of 
detecting the Zbot family, whereas the IC score exceeded the earlier methods in detecting 
the Winwebsec family. Besides, a complete classification was obtained for the NGVCK family 
by almost all the proposed techniques, except for the Vigenère score that is anyway very close 
to the others.  
7.1.4 Conclusions 
Based on these experiments, none of the proposed techniques has proved to be particularly 
effective in detecting the malware samples. The average detection rate (which in the best 
case of SSCT reaches around 0.93) is still far from the perfect detection obtained in Section 
5.2 using dynamic features. The cryptanalytic scores, though, are comparable with the static 
results obtained in previous researches. Unfortunately, this type of approach proved to be 
inconsistent, with results that vary substantially among the different families used in these 
tests. This led to the conclusion that the machine learning based approach was the more 
beneficial. 
 
7.2 Deep Learning versus Gist Descriptors for Image-based Malware Classification 
In our work (Yajamanam, et al., 2018) the problem of malware classification was approached 
by applying a deep neural network where the training was effected by converting malware 
samples in grayscale images. As a mean of comparison, the work in (Oliva, et al., 2001) was 
reproduced, where image features known as “gist descriptors” were extrapolated from the 
samples. In this paper, a method for constructing a “spatial envelope” of an image is 
introduced in terms of various properties such as “naturalness” and “openness.”  The idea is 
to capture the “gist” of the images based on properties that are shown to be meaningful to 
humans, providing a connection between visual and semantic information.  
7.2.1 Related Work 
The motivation for the work presented in this Section is the paper (Nataraj, et al., 2011), 
where high-level image features known as “gist descriptors” are used to successfully classify 
malware samples. The strength and robustness of gist-based malware classification is here 
tested against an image-based deep learning technique that does not employ gist descriptors. 
In (Oliva, et al., 2001), these descriptors, which are shown to be meaningful properties to 
54 
 
humans, are designed to capture the “gist” or essence of an image by providing a connection 
between visual and semantic information. The novelty of our work is the direct approach of 
training the model directly on the obtained images, without extracting any specific feature.  
7.2.2 Experimental setup 
For this research, the dataset defined in Section 2.1 was used, focusing on three major 
families: Zbot, WinWebSec, and ZeroAccess. In fact, these families are the only ones in the 
dataset that have enough samples to train the neural network. However, being our 
experiments based on image samples, the malicious files taken from such families have been 
processed to produced grayscale versions. The procedure is relatively straightforward: a 
single byte of the sample is converted to its grayscale representation, so to obtain a full 
grayscale image where each pixel corresponds to a given byte in the file. However, to ensure 
compatibility among files of different size, the dimensions of the obtained images were kept 
constant. Furthermore, images directly taken from 25 malware families present in Malimg 
were used (though, in the latter case, no image processing is required, since the samples are 
already in grayscale image format). 
The insight of converting malware samples to their grayscale image representation is to test 
how effectively CNN is able to ignore the changes due to obfuscation techniques after a model 
was trained on the given malware family. In fact, the resulting obfuscated samples from the 
same families look particularly similar to the human eye (an example is shown in Figure 1). 
The layers implemented in the CNN are described in Table 3, while the input has a shape of 
[64 * 64 * 3]. 
Table 3 - CNN Layers 
Layer Notes 
Convolutional  30 filters, (3 * 3) kernel size 
Max Pooling  
 
(2 * 2) pool size 
DropOut  
 
Dropping 25% of neurons 
Flatten   
Dense/Fully Connected  128 neurons, Relu activation function 
DropOut  Dropping 50% of neurons 
Dense/Fully Connected  50 neurons, Softmax activation function 
Dense/Fully Connected  
 




     
7.2.3 Transfer learning 
When working in the deep learning field, a crucial obstacle to overcome is the training of the 
model. In fact, training a deep neural network from scratch is computationally an extremely 
intensive task. To speed up this process, an approach known as Transfer Learning was 
followed (Pan, et al., 2010). This started with a model pre-trained on another problem, which 
was then retrained on a similar problem. For our experiments, the artificial neural network 
was pre-trained on the ImageNet Large Visual Recognition Challenge dataset taken from the 
Google Brain project “TensorFlow for Poets” (Tensorflow, 2017). This procedure was 
introduced to implement the Transfer Learning feature. Finally, this model was retrained on 
the raw malware images taken from our dataset.  
7.2.4 Results 
When attempts were made to classify samples from all the 25 malware families in Malimg 
against each other, without taking into consideration the unbalancing of such families in 
terms of samples per family, the obtained accuracy was above 98% (see Figure 16). For these 
experiments, various splits of the training and test data were tested, specifically from 30-70, 
where 30% of images were used for training and 70% for testing, to 90-10, where 90% of 






Figure 16 - Accuracy vs training/testing split for TensorFlow experiments with all 25 Malimg families 
 
This over 98% accuracy is as good as that obtained using gist descriptors (Nataraj, et al., 2011). 
However, since there is no need to extract the gist features beforehand, this technique is 
likely to offer superior performance, especially when scoring large numbers of samples.  
To cope with the unbalancing of the Maligm families, another set of experiments were 
performed where the dataset was first balanced (see Section 2.1). In fact, the number of 
samples of the various malware types varies too much among the families, from an 
overrepresented family with 2949 samples, to an underrepresented family with only 80 
samples.  Hence, the deep learning experiments were repeated, using 80 samples from each 
family. The results of these experiments are summarized in Figure 17, which shows that the 
testing accuracy is significantly lower than in the original unbalanced case. It is likely that the 
improved results in the previous experiments were due to the ease with which the most 
represented families were detected in relation to the others. Unfortunately, the tests in 
(Nataraj, et al., 2011) were based on the unbalanced dataset and no direct comparison can 




Figure 17 - Accuracy vs training/testing split for TensorFlow experiments with all 25 Malimg families (balanced) 
 
7.2.5 Conclusions 
A deep learning approach proved to be effective, even though its results were still far from 
the perfect detection aimed for, especially for the balanced case.  Unfortunately, it also 
introduces the drawback of training the model, that introduces a non-negligible overhead 
even if Transfer Learning is applied. Subsequent experiments (especially those introduced in 
Section 8) do not rely on deep learning, favoring more efficient approaches where no 
preliminary work on the samples is required.  
 
7.3 Function Call Graphs versus Machine Learning for Malware Detection 
An interesting ad-hoc approach based on function call graph technique has proved to perform 
well on some challenging malware detection problems (Shang, et al., 2015). In our work 
(Rajeswaran, et al., 2018), it was decided to compare this against the machine learning 
techniques introduced in Section 4, that is, HMM and SVM.  In addition, it was decided to add 
other two methods, namely, Opcode Graph Similarity and Simple Substitution Distance. These 
experiments were designed to test if machine learning approaches could perform better than 
ad-hoc methods. 
7.3.1 Related Work 
In (Christodorescu, et al., 2003) we see the first implementation of a static analysis malware 
detection technique based on a control flow graph. In (Xu, et al., 2013), the authors develop 
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and analyze a similarity metric based on the function calls in an executable. In (Shang, et al., 
2015) a discussion on the time and space complexities involved in control flow graphs in the 
field of malware detection is proposed. 
While these papers prove that a graph-based approach can be beneficial and obtain 
interesting results, the experimental evidence presented in our work indicates that simpler 
machine learning based scores are significantly more robust when tested against highly 
obfuscated malware samples. 
7.3.2 Experimental setup 
In this research, the dataset described in Section 2.1 focused mainly on the Zbot, ZeroAccess 
and Harebot malware families. To extrapolate the necessary features for the function call 
graph approach, tests heavily relied on IDA Pro, which was used to extract the functions from 
all the executable files used in this research. These functions were categorized as either local 
or external. Local functions are the ones that begin with “sub_xxxxxx proc near” and end with 
“sub_xxxxxx endp”, while the external functions are system calls and library routines. The 
function call graph technique considers only the local functions and the opcode sequences 
within them. A function call graph is of the form 𝐺𝐺 =  (𝑉𝑉,𝐸𝐸), where 𝑉𝑉 is the set of vertices, 
which in our case are the functions, and 𝐸𝐸 is the set of edges, which are the relationships 
between functions. More details about the scoring applied can be found in our work 
(Rajeswaran, et al., 2018). 
Another set of experiments were designed to test the robustness of each technique, 
simulating the effect of code morphing. To achieve this goal, external functions were added 
as dead code, which are randomly inserted as subroutines in the original structure of the 
malware.  
7.3.3 Results 
Table 3 shows the AUC results when function call graph was used for detection against each 
tested family, showing that this technique is capable of detecting Zbot with reasonable 
accuracy. 
Table 4 - Function Call Graph results 







However, it is partially ineffective against ZeroAccess and slightly better than a coin toss 
against Harebot, showing it to be of little or no use as an efficient classifier. 
Table 4 shows the results of the robustness experiments on the malware family Zbot. It is 
clear how much the AUC deteriorates when a greater percentage of dead code functions is 
added to the samples. The technique reaches a level of detection that is sub-par in 
comparison to an acceptable detection rate, even adding a relatively small percentage of 
dead code functions. 












Figure 18 shows a direct comparison between function call graph and the other techniques, 
particularly, against the proposed machine learning algorithms. The scores shown for the 
remaining approaches are taken from our work (Singh, et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 18 - Comparison Function Call Graph score vs Machine Learning Score for Zbot 
 
It is observable that the machine learning techniques, i.e., HMM and SVM, are generally more 
robust than the function call graph approach. That is, to defeat the machine learning 
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algorithms, the malware code must be morphed to a very high degree before observing a 
degrade in the detection rate. This requirement is particularly true for SVM.  
7.3.4 Conclusions  
In general, function call graph can perform well against particular families, but it appears to 
be somewhat “fragile” in comparison to machine learning algorithms. This characteristic is 
crucial because it indicates that if an attacker can study the ad-hoc strategy used for 
detection, it could be possible to design a morphing strategy that would be able to degrade 
the detection rate considerably.  
 
7.4 Robust Hashing for Image-Based Malware Classification 
Section 7.3 showed that machine learning, and especially SVM, outperformed an ad-hoc 
technique such as function call graph. In our work (Huang, et al., 2018), SVM was compared 
with another sophisticated approach based on robust hashing which has the peculiarity that 
when two inputs are similar, the hashes of the two samples look very similar. This property is 
the exact opposite of the collision resistance characteristic of a cryptographic hash function. 
7.4.1 Related Work 
The paper (Venkatesan, et al., 2000) proposes robust image hashing to handle the 
proliferation of digital images. Feature extraction for robust image hashing is considered in 
(Monga, et al., 2006), where the proposed process consists of feature vector extraction 
followed by compression, with accuracy close to 83%, while the technique in (Venkatesan, et 
al., 2000) relies on wavelet decomposition for image feature extraction, with accuracy close 
to 80%. The novelty of the work described in this Section is to combine both approaches to 
increase the detection rate in the malware classification problem, obtaining an accuracy 
superior to 88%.  
7.4.2 Experimental setup 
Since this is another image-based detection, the same dataset as the one seen in our work 
(Yajamanam, et al., 2018) in Section 7.2 was used.  Two image-based robust hashing 
techniques were examined, one that relies on wavelet analysis, and one that uses distributed 
coding. To be able to test SVM against 2D images, an image-based feature was extracted that 
deals with horizontal edges. 
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By applying robust hashing to image samples, similar hashes can be obtained from two images 
differ by a few details. Taking advantage of this property, malware samples that belong to the 
same family can be detected, even in the presence of some degree of obfuscation. The idea 
is that the modified code would still maintain enough information on the original structure of 
the file so as to furnish a similar hash as the one obtained without obfuscation. 
 
 
Figure 19 - Process of robust hashing 
 
Figure 19 shows the full process used to apply robust hashing. This technique is the same as 
that used in (Monga, et al., 2006), where two steps are performed. The first one involves the 
extraction of the relevant features to generate an intermediate hash value, while in the 
second negates minor differences and noise through compression step, allowing the final 
hash value to be generated. Two different compression techniques have been tested in this 
research: one is based on error-correcting codes, while the other on distributed source 
coding. For these experiments, several image features were collected from the dataset 
samples, i.e., Local Binary Pattern, Histogram of Oriented Gradient, Horizontal Edges, Pixel 
Intensity, Contrast, Median Filter, Frequency Distribution and Wavelet Transform. More 
details about these image features and the compression techniques can be found in our work 
(Huang, et al., 2018) and in the referenced papers. 
7.4.3 Results 
Figure 20 shows the results using SVM per each of the tested families. In this case, the average 
classification accuracy obtained per family was of around 84%, while per individual sample 
the average rises to around 93%. It is, in fact, possible to observe in the Figure that some of 
the least represented families in terms of samples are obtaining an inferior classification 
accuracy. Furthermore, removing the seven families with the lowest accuracy, an average in 
excess of 98% was obtained. These results prove how powerful a single feature as the 






Figure 20 - Classification accuracy using SVM 
 
Further investigations aimed to find the tradeoff between the features used and the accuracy 
obtained. To achieve this goal, both univariate feature selection (UFS) and recursive feature 
elimination (RFE) were applied (see Section 4.3.1). The results confirm that the most 
prominent feature is, indeed, the horizontal edge, which was further analyzed using RFE. 
Figure 21 shows the outcome of this experiment. Recall that this edge feature is 256 






Figure 21 - RFE result on horizontal edge feature 
 
This 169-dimensional set of horizontal edge features was used in the subsequent SVM 
experiments showing the per family accuracy average increased from around 84% to around 
92%. 
Next, the robust hashing approaches were tested. The first set of experiments tested an error-
correcting algorithm based on a 2-dimensional Haar wavelet transform and a five-level 
decomposition. The average accuracy, in this case, is about 79%. This result proves that this 
specific approach is weaker compared to the SVM detection seen earlier. The second set of 
experiments used distributed coding, from which the average obtained is slightly over 83%. 
This is an improvement in comparison to the wavelet-based approach, but still not on par 
with SVM. Finally, a multiphase strategy was implemented and tested to robust hashing, 
where both wavelet-based and distributed coding based robust hashes were combined. 
Intuitively, two robust hashing algorithms were combined by scoring with both techniques, 
and when the classifications disagreed, the one with the higher accuracy for its model was 
selected. In this combined case, an improved accuracy of above 87% was obtained. 











In conclusion, an optimized SVM obtained somewhat superior detection accuracy, but the 
best robust hashing results are comparable. However, it is worth noting that robust hashing 
performed better than the SVM on most families, while a few malware families are too 
complicated to classify. This is due to the amount of obfuscation applied to the samples of 
these specific families. It seems that the more prevalent obfuscation is in the samples, the 
more distinct the hashes are, which results in a less accurate detection. In contrast, the SVM 
yields more consistent results over the 25 families. For this reason, the consistency in accuracy 
obtained by applying machine learning algorithms was favored. In particular, it was proved 
how effective SVM could be, even in this case, after being advantageous already in the zero-
day experiments seen in Section 6. Section 8 introduces techniques to boost the detection 
rate of different approaches and Section 8.2 uses SVM to combine these scores, proving even 
further how malleable and effective this algorithm can be in the malware detection problem. 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
After this set of experiments, we had a clear understanding of how effective machine learning 
based classification can be in detecting highly obfuscated samples when compared to ad-hoc 
techniques.  In particular, SVMs were tested in several cases and proved to be a feasible 
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algorithm on top of which building our static classification technique. More importantly, it 
proved to be particularly effective when used as a meta-classifier. HMMs were also tested in 
several experiments and proved to be reliable and consistent. A combination of these two 
techniques seemed the right way to obtain improved classification so to reach higher accuracy 







































8 Improved classification 
 
 
Section 5.2 applied PHMM using dynamic features to classify malware samples, obtaining AUC 
of 1.0, that is, perfect detection. The static based experiments have not yet been able to reach 
this grade of detection. However, this Section proposes approaches to increase further the 
static analysis detection rate so to achieve the ideal classification. Specifically, the following 
methods were tested: our work in (Raghavan, et al., 2019) uses a comparison between HMM 
with random restarts and AdaBoost, while our work in (Singh, et al., 2016) proposes a 
different application of SVMs where those are used to combine scores from several other 
techniques.  
 
8.1 Improved Hidden Markov Models for malware detection 
Considering that the training for Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) is based on a hill climb, it is 
possible to improve the model by simply trying different initial values. In our work (Raghavan, 
et al., 2019), attempts were made to test HMM with random restarts and compare it with 
another popular technique to boost classifying results. This boosting technique is known as 
AdaBoost (Section 4.8), which here is used to build a “boosted” version of HMM where the 
classifiers used in the AdaBoost algorithm are based on different HMMs, each of which 
initialized with a different random starting model. Apart from the standard classification of 
the samples, experiments were introduced whereby the samples were “morphed”, i.e. a 
variable percentage of benign opcode sequences were added to the original code. These 
experiments were meant to simulate morphing strategies by the malware creators. Another 
more complex testing challenge defined as “cold start” was also proposed: in the “cold start” 
case, the models rely only on a limited amount of training data, thus limiting the classifying 
effectiveness of the proposed technique. This approach is meant to reproduce the case where 
samples of a new malware family have been detected, but they are still too limited in number 
to obtain sufficient training of the machine learning models.  
8.1.1 Related Work 
Interestingly, it appears that combining HMM and boosting have not previously received 
much attention in the information security domain, with the exception of the paper (Chen, et 
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al., 2009) in the context of anomaly detection. In our work, we proposed a detailed 
implementation of this technique in detecting obfuscated malware, with in addition a 
comparison with HMM with random restarts and a classic HMM-based classification. 
Furthermore, the set of experiments described in this Section includes a so-called “cold start” 
problem, where limited training data is available. The idea is to simulate the slow discovery 
of new malware samples belonging to an unknown malicious family while a model for such 
family is being built.  
8.1.2 Results 
The dataset used is the one defined in Section 2.1, limiting the experiments to the Cridex, 
Harebot, Security Shield, Zbot, and ZeroAccess families, while the feature used was opcodes 
sequences. Figure 23 shows that HMM with random restarts obtains better results than the 
average HMM, where the “average HMM” is the average model over 1000 HMMs, justifying 
the additional workload during the training phase. However, the boosted HMM outperforms 
HMM with random restarts in classifying Cridex and Security Shield, while it has little effect 
on the results for Harebot, Zbot, and ZeroAccess.  
 
 
Figure 23 - Initial Experiments 
 
An essential drawback in using AdaBoost is the increased workload during the scoring phase 
since multiple HMMs are used in the boosted classifier. On the other hand, for random 
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restarts the best model was selected, and hence the scoring step is no more costly than a 
single HMM. Keeping this in mind, it was concluded that random restarts were the approach 
to select. In fact, the advantage given by boosting is marginal in relation to the results 
obtained with random restarts.  
Figure 24 shows the results of the testing experiments after morphing the malware samples, 
that is, after adding random sequences of opcodes taken from the benign dataset. Note that 
the obtained samples are not functional, because the sequences have been added directly to 
the extracted opcodes lists. Three morphing cases were considered. First, benign code 
equivalent to 10% of the original malware code was inserted, followed by 50% morphing, and 
finally, 100% morphing. As with the previous experiments, the differences between the 
average HMM and the best of the random restarts model is generally significant. On the other 
hand, the differences between the random restarts and the boosted model are not incisive in 
the majority of the cases. The exceptions are Cridex at 10% morphing and ZeroAccess at 50% 
morphing, where both show substantial improvement for the boosted models. 
Because it is not possible to clearly state that boosting offers better performance, the results 
still favorited HMM with random restarts over the boosted HMM, since the improvement 







Figure 24 - Morphing experiments 
 
The final experiments introduced the “cold start” cases, a special type of problem that deals 
with training data that is severely limited. This particular test observes the advantage of the 
random restarts over the average application of an HMM model. The benefit of boosting in 
these experiments, though less pronounced, was still significant in some cases, especially 
those that were the most challenging for the random restarts.  
8.1.3 Conclusions 
This set of experiments leads to the conclusion that the overhead introduced by boosting is 
worthwhile only in extremely challenging cases, while HMM with random restarts is the best 
choice in other cases. However, both approaches proved to be superior to the generic 
application of HMMs. The scores though, even in the best cases, were still far from the ideal 
detection obtained in Section 5.2. For this reason, in Section 8.2, a different type of improved 
classification mechanism is proposed. 
   
8.2 Support vector machines and malware detection 
In our work (Singh, et al., 2016), another approach was tested to improve the detection rate 
of different algorithms. In conjunction with the methods covered in Section 7.3, ad-hoc 
detection algorithms with machine learning using Support Vector Machines (SVMs) were 
incorporated as a means to combine different scoring techniques. Specifically, feature vectors 
for SVM were built combining scores from HMM, Opcode Graph Similarity (OGS) and Simple 
Substitution Distance (SSD). More details about these two algorithms can be found in (Singh, 
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et al., 2016). As in Section 8.1, this approach was tested by simulating code morphing of the 
malware samples.  
8.2.1 Related Work 
Combining various classification techniques has been explored in (Zhang, et al., 2007) where 
the authors use Dempster–Shafer theory to create combining rules for individual decisions 
based on probabilistic neural network (PNN) classifiers. The ensemble outperforms the 
individual PNN classifiers. The paper (Lu, et al., 2010) considers an ensemble method, called  
SVM-AR, which combines a SVM with association rules. The authors conclude that this 
algorithm is essentially a single learning algorithm that yields better results than some 
ensemble techniques. Based on these promising results, our work implements an ensemble 
technique where the novelty is defined by using SVMs as a meta-classifier to combine scores 
from other algorithms. The idea is to produce a more in-depth classification over a 
multidimensional space, taking advantage of the so-called kernel trick introduced in the SVM 
algorithm.  
8.2.2 Results 
As in the previous research, the dataset used is the one described in Section 8.1, with the 
addition of NGVSK malware family samples. The feature used was, again, opcodes sequences 
extracted from the dataset files. NGVSK samples have been classified ideally (AUC = 1.0) by 
each of the individual techniques. As expected, when SVM was used to combine these scores, 
the AUC was again 1.0.  
 
 




Figure 25 shows the results of the morphing experiments, still for the NGVCK family. In this 
case, opcodes sequences from the benign samples were added directly in the sequence of 
malware opcodes. It is observable that the HMM score deteriorates significantly even at only 
10 % morphing. The OGS score only began to fail at 50 % morphing, while the SSD scores 
began to fail at 60 % morphing. On the other hand, SVM, combining all the other scores, 
proved to be particularly robust: in fact, the SVM achieved ideal detection until the morphing 
rate reached 100%. Moreover, even in the other cases, SVM outperformed the results 
obtained for all the individual scores.  This outcome clearly shows the strength of the SVM as 
a method for combining scores obtained by other classification algorithms. 
After this preliminary test, the results of this approach were compared to those seen in 
Section 5.2, obtained using PHMM and dynamic analysis. Hence, to allow a fair comparison, 
this approach was tested against samples taken from the same families, as seen in Section 
5.2. All the ROC curves of these experiments can be found in (Singh, et al., 2016). Of the 
individual scores, the HMM consistently performed well, while the SSD was satisfactory only 
in some cases. However, the OGS was the weakest of the three algorithms. It was also 
observed that the SVM achieved ideal separation for all families, a result entirely on par with 
that seen in Section 5.2. 
Moreover, in the morphing experiments the HMM tended again to decline significantly at low 
morphing rates. However, unlike the NGVCK results, the OGS score generally gave the poorest 
results. Considering SSD, instead, the results were surprising, with the detection accuracy that 
improved at lower morphing rates in few cases. 
8.2.3 Conclusions 
Overall, the use of SVMs to combine individual scores outperformed the direct application of 
the single techniques, with the one exception of the SSD algorithm, that performed slightly 
better in a few cases at midrange morphing rates. In almost every case, the SVM combined 
score technique was better initially and proved to be more robust to code morphing, 
degrading more slowly than any of the other approaches. 
Regarding the dynamic experiments from Section 5.2, combining scores using SVM allowed 
the same ideal rate of detection to be reached as when using dynamic features. Hence, even 
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though based on static analysis, when SVM was used to combine scores, a form of improved 
classification was achieved that is robust and effective. 
  
8.3 Conclusions 
The results obtained through AdaBoost were particularly interesting for the “cold start” 
problem. However, the use of such algorithm (and the overhead introduced in the 
classification phase) was not beneficial in the other experiments where HMM with random 
restarts was able to reach comparable results. In both cases, while proving the potential of 
these techniques, the perfect detection that we were aiming for was not reached yet. 
However, as intuitively understood by the set of experiments in the previous Sections, the 
use of SVMs as meta-classifier proved to be particularly effective in boosting the outcome of 
our classification accuracy. In fact, not only this approach reached perfect detection, but it 
was also able to maintain this detection rate even in case of dead code insertion up to 100% 






















9 Generic Malware Models 
 
 
This Section analyzes the case where a generic malware model is used for classification 
instead of a specific model for each family to classify. In the previous Sections, different 
techniques were tested that proved to be suitable as malware detection tools.  However, with 
the only exception of the zero-day experiments, all the models were pre-trained on the 
specific malware families to detect which created a 1-to-1 relationship between the samples 
to classify and the model created. However, the approach where a comprehensive model is 
built from several families sees more realistic since we would be able to detect multiple 
families without the necessity to run individual models for each family. In a real-life scenario, 
this would be very complex and inefficient to pursue, because a separate machine learning 
model would need to be built on each malware family to detect. This Section analyzes how 
effective a generic malware model could be and how much it degrades as the number of 
families used to generate it is increased.  
 
9.1 On the Effectiveness of Generic Malware Models 
(Bagga, et al., 2018) addressed the problem of generic malware models performing 
experiments over four machine learning algorithms to determine the tradeoff between 
generality and accuracy. The first algorithm tested was SVM, which proved to be particularly 
robust in the experiments seen in Section 8.2. Techniques considered were the chi-squared 
(𝜒𝜒2), and two neighborhood based techniques, namely, 𝑘𝑘-nearest neighbors (𝑘𝑘-NN) and 
random forests. The type of experiments performed can be summarized in analyzing the 
strength of each of these models when increasing the number of malware families in the 
training set. In other words, the model used for detection was made constantly more generic.  
9.1.1 Related Work 
The novelty of our work is to determine the accuracy of 𝑛𝑛-gram based malware models as a 
function of the generality of the training data. We build n-grams following the steps in (Reddy, 
et al., 2006), where the authors use a feature selection method that ranks 𝑛𝑛-grams based on 
frequency and entropy. Their experiments show that performing a class-wise feature 
selection improves the efficiency of the models. This process involves extracting the 𝑘𝑘 most 
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frequent 𝑛𝑛-grams from the benign and malware sets and using a union of the two sets as 
features. Considering the interesting outcome of this research, a similar approach is followed 
in our 𝑛𝑛-gram analysis described here. On the other hand, in (Raff, et al., 2016), the authors 
claim that 𝑛𝑛-grams are not suitable for malware detection obtaining poor results using elastic-
net regularized logistic regression. These experiments were conducted using a large dataset 
consisting of over 200,000 malware samples. Unfortunately, the authors’ data was obtained 
from an undisclosed industry partner and is not available for independent verification of the 
results.  
9.1.2 Experimental Design 
This research, used the same dataset as in Section 2.1, though it focused specifically on the 
Microsoft Malware Classification Challenge samples. This type of experiment needed a large 
number of samples per family, and not all the families present in the other collections 
contained enough of them. In total, eight malware families were experimented upon. 
Furthermore, opcodes sequences were not used since exhaustive experiments had already 
been tried in past research. This time, the machine learning models were trained based on n-
grams features, which proved to be more reliable for this type of experiment. Specifically, 2-
grams, 3-grams, and 4-grams were used. More details about this procedure and the feature 
reduction technique used in this case can be found in (Bagga, et al., 2018). To measure the 
success of such experiments, the concept of balanced accuracy was used, which is computed 
as  










TP = True positives (malware samples correctly classified as malware) 
TN = True negative (benign samples correctly classified as benign) 
FP = False positive (benign samples misclassified as malware) 
FN = False negative (malware samples misclassified as benign) 
 
This type of scoring technique was chosen because the size of the benign dataset varies 
depending on how many malware families are combined in each experiment. In fact, balanced 
accuracy calculation weights all classification errors the same, regardless of any imbalance 
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that might exist between the sizes of the positive and negative sets. However, for the 𝜒𝜒2 
experiments, the area under the ROC curve (AUC) was used as a mean of determining the 
efficacy of the technique (see Section 2.2.1).  
While for 𝑘𝑘-NNs and random forests there is no need for training, the following approach was 
used to train SVM and 𝜒𝜒2. First, each of the eight malware families was tested individually. 
Later, for each family, one experiment using all available samples from the family was 
performed, and another test was conducted using a selection of 1,000 samples. Next, SVMs 
were trained for each of the �82� = 28 pairs of the malware families in our dataset. Then, 
SVMs for all �83� = 56 combined sets of three families were trained, and afterward, all �
8
4� =
70 sets of four families. This continued up to one very large set that includes all 8 families. In 
each case, the average balanced accuracy over all cases was computed for a given number of 
combined families.  
9.1.3 Results 
Each test experimented with 2-gram, 3-gram, and 4-gram features. However, it was found 
that 2-grams gave the best results. Figure 26 shows the overall results using 2-grams as the 
number of families in the training set increases. The points are representative of the average 
accuracy obtained per each number of families in the model. The results show that random 
forest is the most reliable and most robust technique, with 𝑘𝑘-NN obtaining close results. On 
the other hand, SVM (that so well scored in robustness experiments in Section 8.2) proved to 
be not a suitable algorithm for this type of test.  It is also clear that the more generic is the 














In these experiments, we confronted the problem of building a comprehensive malware 
model from several combined malware families. In particular, we focused on byte n-gram 
based analysis and we found that bigrams gave the best results.  
In addition, the neighborhood based techniques (random forest and 𝑘𝑘-NN) proved to be the 
more robust. However, we observed that accuracy generally suffers as the models become 
more generic. Hence, we are likely to suffer a significant penalty with respect to classification 


















After demonstrating the limited utility of hybrid approaches to training and testing, this work 
focused on classic static and dynamic analysis. Experiments with PHMM and dynamic features 
were able to reach perfect detection in all the tested cases. However, dynamic analysis 
introduces the critical overhead of the execution of the samples to test. So, to overcome this 
drawback, experiments on static analysis became the main topic of this work, with the intent 
to reach perfect detection. With static analysis all the necessary features can be extracted 
directly from the binary data.  
To understand which machine learning algorithms were more effective, their models were 
challenged against the complex challenge of detecting zero-day samples. These previously 
undiscovered malware files were identified with reasonable accuracy by both clustering 
algorithms and SVM. Even though the classification was not perfect, the results were still 
promising, especially considering the difficulty of detecting unknown samples. Also, SVM was 
introduced as an effective mean of detection.  
Another set of experiments were used to justify the use of machine learning against other 
means of detection, such as ad-hoc algorithms. These tested the efficacy of cryptanalytic 
techniques that obtained decent results, even though it was inconsistent when compared to 
machine learning approaches. Following this, deep learning with a particular type of image 
analysis based on so-called gist descriptors was investigated. Although the two methods 
obtained similar results, the need to convert binary files to images and the slow process of 
training an artificial neural network provided an incentive to work on different types of 
information extrapolated from the data. Later, ad-hoc methods were tested, such as function 
call graph; this, while obtaining comparable results to the machine learning algorithms, was 
not strong enough to resist the robustness experiments. That is, the detection rate 
deteriorated easily with the increasing of morphing data rate in the malware samples. Finally, 
robust hashing proved to reach comparable detection rate to SVM, but the results were not 
as consistent. In all these experiments, machine learning approaches proved to be more 
productive than the other methods.  
The advantage of malware detection based on machine learning models therefore seems to 
be clear.  However, as it became clear that a straightforward static model would not achieve 
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ideal classification, techniques which combine scores from different detection algorithms 
were tested. Three different approaches were tested to boost static scores: HMM with 
random restarts, AdaBoost, and SVM. The first two obtained favorable results, but only SVM 
was able to reach perfect detection in all cases. Furthermore, the combination technique via 
SVM was based on particularly efficient algorithms; hence, to reduce the overhead introduced 
by the need to compute and combine all those scores.  
Finally, experiments were introduced to test a generic malware model, that is, a model 
trained on several malware families. In this case, SVM was not able to obtain promising 
results, while 𝑘𝑘-NN and random forests proved to be more effective. 
 
10.1 Countermeasures 
Different techniques can be utilized to hamper static detection through SVMs used as meta-
classifier. SVMs are fed with several scores from various techniques, thus, a way to impede 
this fundamental step is by reducing the likelihood to get the actual features. A possible 
example can be by packing the code, or portions of it, in a similar fashion as polymorphic 
malware. This technique would be sufficient to confuse the statistics of many malware 
families, but at the same time would make the sample subject to other type of detection 
techniques based on entropy (an example is (Baysa, et al., 2013)) and still subject to unpacking 
by advanced disassembler such as IDA Pro. Also, the necessary unpacked code used to expose 
the packed part of the file may still be subject to detection (Stamp, 2011). An approach that 
would not require encryption or compression of the information is the addition of dead code. 
In fact, dead code insertion would influence the statistics of the original code enough to 
hamper detection for each of the combined techniques used to train the SVM algorithm. 
However, as shown in this work, the amount of added code needs to be conspicuous (at least 
more than 100% of the original code). It is also important to highlight that some techniques 
have been proposed to remove unreached code from executable files (Xi, 1999) and they 
could be used as preliminary step in detecting these type of samples. 
Regarding dynamic detection through API calls sequences, little work has been proposed on 
obfuscating this feature. However, due to the poor results obtained by PHMM against static 
(and highly obfuscated) features (Attaluri, et al., 2009), it is possible that an attempt to apply 
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